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24 April 1958

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

24 April 1958

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

[redacted] *yes* USSR-Yugoslavia: Recent Soviet efforts to force the Yugoslavs to capitulate on ideological issues have resulted in the most serious crisis in Yugoslav-Soviet relations since the death of Stalin. As the public argument continues, both Moscow and Belgrade are attempting to keep their ideological dispute from harming intergovernment relations, but the past record makes the success of these efforts doubtful. In anticipation of a deterioration in Yugoslav-Soviet ties, more than the usual number of friendly references to the West have been included in the major speeches made so far at the Yugoslav party congress.

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*yes* [redacted] Poland's refusal fully to endorse the USSR's position in the Yugoslav-Soviet ideological dispute is a flaw in the bloc unity on which the Russians have based their stand and may disrupt Poland's relatively amicable relations with the USSR. Although Poland has registered its "serious reservations" over passages of the Yugoslav party program which the Soviet Union has criticized, it has agreed with Yugoslavia on the basic principle of party independence and autonomy. The other bloc countries so far heard from--Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China--have supported the Soviet position. [redacted]

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
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*yes*

USSR--nuclear propaganda: As a part of its campaign against the forthcoming US nuclear test series and the proposed US program for dumping nuclear waste material in the Pacific, the USSR has recently publicized statements by Soviet scientists on the hazards connected with the disposal of radioactive wastes in the Pacific Ocean. These statements are contrary to earlier views expressed by Soviet oceanographers that certain areas of the Pacific would be suitable for dumping. Attacks by Soviet scientists along these lines can be expected to continue. 

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA



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North Africa: The Tunisian Government is advising the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) not to create a government-in-exile at this time. Nevertheless, Tunis would recognize such a government even though this action would cause a rupture with France, and Morocco would follow suit. The Iraqi foreign minister, who recently turned over \$140,000 to the FLN, states that Iraq, too, would extend recognition. The Algerian rebels have again stepped up their terrorist campaign against Moslem collaborators with the French, mostly in the cities of eastern Algeria. Meanwhile, the American consul general in Algiers reports that anti-American sentiment among local Europeans and French officials has reached an unprecedented height. (Page 6)

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Lebanon: President Chamoun has informed the British ambassador that he has offered to renounce his aspirations for a second term in favor of army commander General Shihab. The general has not yet decided whether to accept Chamoun's offer. Since Chamoun's move is a reversal of his firmly reiterated intentions and runs counter to his own recent estimates of his political strength, Chamoun may be banking on the general refusing his offer.

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### III. THE WEST

Cyprus: The situation on Cyprus now seems to be the most critical since EOKA declared a truce in March 1957. EOKA is threatening the resumption of full-scale violence unless a satisfactory British statement of an intention to settle the Cyprus dispute is forthcoming in the next few days. Moderate elements among Greek Cypriot leaders, including Archbishop Makarios, have apparently been overoptimistic about their ability to exercise restraint.

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France: Solution of the government crisis seems still distant. Democratic Resistance leader Rene Pleven now is trying to form a coalition, but the necessary compromises by the major parties seem unlikely to be reached at least until after the runoff local elections on 27 April.

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DAILY BRIEF

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Yugoslav-Soviet Rift Widens

The latest public exchanges indicate that it will be increasingly difficult for the USSR and Yugoslavia to prevent the ideological dispute at the party level from spreading to the governments. Not since Stalin expelled Tito from the Cominform in 1948 has Moscow so forcefully declared that Tito must change his basic dogma before he can again be considered acceptable in Moscow's eyes.

Criticism of the USSR expressed by Aleksandar Rankovic, one of Tito's two top aides, at the seventh congress of the Yugoslav Communist party on 23 April surpassed the more moderate criticism contained in Tito's opening speech of 22 April. Rankovic charged that the "old and rusty weapons of the Cominform" were being sharpened and that a new policy of pressure on Yugoslavia was beginning. He condemned the USSR indirectly for interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.

In an obvious protest against Rankovic's remarks, most Sino-Soviet bloc ambassadors in Belgrade who were attending the congress in lieu of official delegations failed to return for the second portion of the speech. The Polish ambassador, however, returned.

The tone of Yugoslav remarks at the congress indicates that Belgrade is not planning concessions which would satisfy Moscow's inflexible position. Speeches which emphasized Yugoslav independence from Moscow have received the greatest acclaim from the Yugoslav delegates. Apparently expecting the dispute to lead to a degeneration of government ties, major Yugoslav speakers in the last week have included friendly references to the West. Belgrade may fear that the USSR will not carry out existing trade and aid agreements, even though this would be less of a problem for Belgrade than in 1948.

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Poles Refrain From Fully Endorsing Moscow Line  
On Yugoslavia

While available comment from other parties of the Sino-Soviet bloc has fully endorsed Moscow's line on the Yugoslav party congress, the Polish party daily has taken an independent stand. Warsaw's action and the failure of the Polish ambassador to join in the bloc walkout at the Yugoslav party congress may result in a deterioration in Polish-Soviet relations.

The Polish daily expressed "serious reservations" on many of the points of the Yugoslav theses which Moscow has criticized, but endorsed Yugoslavia's right to pursue its own road to socialism by declaring for "autonomy of all parties and noninterference in internal affairs." The Polish daily declared that while the party "could not remain indifferent to the formulation of the program regarding the fundamental problem of theory and practice of the international workers' movement," it was not customary for "representatives of several parties to take part in arguments at a congress of one party."

The general tone of the article was not unfriendly to Yugoslavia, praising its marked improvement of relations with the bloc parties and its efforts in the defense of peace.

The Polish position reflects Gomulka's sensitivity to possible Soviet interference in the affairs of his own country. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Propaganda Plays Up Danger of Dumping Radioactive Wastes in Pacific

Soviet propaganda has recently attempted to link the dangers of radioactive fallout from the forthcoming US nuclear test series with the hazards of dumping radioactive wastes in the Pacific Ocean. Statements by Soviet scientists that these wastes would contaminate surrounding waters and living organisms closely parallel the Soviet Government's note of 28 March warning that radioactive fallout from the Pacific tests would pollute the ocean waters, contaminate fish, and damage the fishing industry.


These statements, however, are contrary to the views expressed by other Soviet scientists at an international conference of oceanographers in 1957 to the effect that the disposal of radioactive waste in very deep areas of the ocean would pose no problem. Soviet spokesmen at the time agreed that the most favorable place for dumping would be one of the deepest points in the Pacific. Further attacks by Soviet scientists on US testing and disposal programs in the Pacific can be expected.

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Algerians Continue to Debate Advisability of Forming  
Government-in-Exile

The Tunisian Government is still attempting to dissuade the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) from creating a government-in-exile. Although some Algerian leaders accept the Tunisian thesis that such a step would be disadvantageous, rebel leaders inside Algeria argue that establishment of a government now might draw enough overt military and economic aid for the rebellion to outweigh all disadvantages. The FLN is said to be considering naming a well-known "moderate" to head such a government. The timing of an announcement may be determined by the conference of North African political parties in Tangier which was originally scheduled for 27 April but has been postponed "for a few days."

Tunisian Secretary of State for the Presidency and National Defense Bahi Ladgham states that if the Algerians do take such a step, Tunisia would be the first to extend recognition even though this would mean a complete rupture of relations with France. Ladgham believes that Morocco, which likewise opposes the formation of a government-in-exile, would also recognize it. The Iraqi foreign minister, who admits having recently turned over \$140,000 to FLN leaders directly rather than through the Arab League, states that Iraqi recognition would follow that of the North African states. The United Arab Republic and various Asian states would probably also take similar action.

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### III. THE WEST

#### EOKA May Soon Resume Hostilities Against British on Cyprus

American and British officials on Cyprus agree that the current threat of full-scale violence by the Greek Cypriot terrorist organization EOKA is serious. The steady weakening of moderate Greek Cypriot control over EOKA leader Grivas and his organization has become increasingly apparent in the rapid deterioration of the alleged "campaign of passive resistance" and the increasing number and seriousness of bombings and other violence. Grivas has evinced a growing impatience, which probably reflects pressure from his followers to get on with the struggle.

EOKA issued a leaflet on 21 April demanding that Britain resume negotiations aimed at solving the Cyprus problem or face the threat of a general EOKA offensive. Greek Cypriot spokesmen emphasize that if a satisfactory statement of intentions to negotiate is not forthcoming in the next few days, EOKA will resume full-scale violence.

The Turkish Cypriots, who demonstrated belligerently but without serious incident in Nicosia on 23 April-- Turkish Youth Day--would welcome resumption of violence as a step toward partition.

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